ALPA’s Significant Role in Post-9/11 Security Enhancements

Editor’s note: In celebration of ALPA’s 95th anniversary this year, this nine-part Air Line Pilot series revisits some of the union’s “wins”—successful campaigns, projects, and products that make public air transportation safer and more secure and that improve the working lives of the union’s members.

ALPA Wins, Part 7: A New Approach to Security

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, uncovered significant flaws and deficiencies in the U.S. aviation security network—breaches that ALPA would make a priority to highlight and address. The perpetrators involved in these attacks applied strategies that differed greatly from the previous terrorist and hijacking methods that the aviation industry had experienced in the past.

The Association quickly recognized that a new approach was called for, one that applied proactive, risk-based measures rather than the outdated, reactive strategies of the past. Just as important, labor, government, airlines, and other industry stakeholders would need to communicate, work together, and share information if this new approach to safeguard the aviation system was to succeed.

Capt. Duane Woerth, ALPA’s president during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, foreshadowed the Association’s engagement in this effort in the October 2001 issue of Air Line Pilot. In his “President’s Forum” column, he noted, “Our responsibility as airline pilots for the safety of our passengers and other crewmembers requires that we play an important role in the creation of any new security initiative our governments implement.”

“We cannot tolerate procedures that create an illusion of security for the traveling public but, in fact, do not make air travel any safer and denigrate the high esteem most passengers hold toward their pilots,” he stated.

In the months that followed, numerous airport and airline security measures were implemented, including a new common strategy for dealing with those who threaten the integrity of air travel. Gone was the approach of “accommodate, negotiate, and do not escalate,” intended to appease political extremists’ attempts to secure prisoner releases or political agendas. The mission and motives of the 9/11 terrorists were much more sinister in nature.

Among the recommendations submitted to then Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta from a rapid response team, of which Woerth was a member, were a significant number of proposals that placed a new priority on defending the flight deck at all costs.

Onboard Intervention

On 9/11, the FAA’s Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) consisted of 33 active air marshals primarily assigned to international flights. FAMS, which was established on March 2, 1962, and later evolved to become the Sky Marshal Program under the FAA and U.S. Customs Service, was woefully understaffed and underfunded to provide any meaningful enforcement or deterrence.

However, following the events of 9/11, FAMS was transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Hundreds of federal officers from various law enforcement organizations accepted permanent appointments as federal air marshals, and on October 16, 2005, FAMS was reassigned to DHS’s newly formed Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

Just two weeks after the attacks, however, ALPA pressed Congress for what it believed was a more feasible solution—the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program. This approach would improve aviation security by training and deputizing airline pilots to carry firearms and defend the flight deck against hostile threats.

The FFDO program was formally established in 2003 as a division of FAMS, following passage of the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002. Since its creation, thousands of pilots have volunteered and undergone extensive training to become FFDOs, protecting approximately one million flights per year, for a total of more than 23 million flights since the program was initiated.

As airline pilots volunteering to protect the flight deck, FFDOs receive no compensation from the government for their security responsibilities; however, FAMS are full-time federal law enforcement professionals. The cost to cover a flight with a federal air marshal is between $3,000 to $3,500; covering the same segment with an FFDO costs between $20 and $25.

As the FFDO program continues to demonstrate its worth, the Association is seeking greater support in the form of increased federal funding. ALPA also continues to advocate for the relocation of the existing initial training facility, the addition of new a recurrent training facility, enhancements to the training curriculum to provide FFDOs with augmented professional development.

In addition, the Association regularly pursues other needed improvements through an FFDO stakeholder group, which includes representatives from government, airlines, and other related organizations.

In Canada, shortly after 9/11, ALPA successfully convinced the minister of Transport that the country needed a robust air marshal program. Soon after, the Canadian Royal Mounted Police stood up the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program, with law enforcement officials who function much like federal air marshals.

Hardened Doors and Secondary Barriers

Defending the flight deck at all costs also means preventing those with nefarious intent from accessing the pilots and aircraft controls during flight. In 2003, the FAA mandated flight deck doors made of bullet-resistant composite materials and heavy-duty locking mechanisms.

While the Association applauded this action, it raised two distinct concerns that regulators failed to address. ALPA highlighted through its “One Level of Safety” campaign the enormous security gap that remained after 9/11 due to regulators not requiring the same intrusion-resistant doors on the flight decks of all-cargo aircraft.

The Association argued that all-cargo flights frequently carry nonflight crew personnel, including charter riders and animal handlers, who don’t receive the same level of screening as passengers on passenger flights and who can easily access the flight deck during flight. The union continues to press Congress for legislation such as the Cargo Flight Deck Security Act to address this industry double standard.

In addition, ALPA has called for the installation of secondary barriers to protect the flight deck as hardened flight deck doors and current procedures alone don’t adequately protect the flight deck anytime the door is opened. These lightweight and retractable security gates are inexpensive and easily deployed before opening a flight deck door.

After years of delay, the FAA finalized a rule in 2023 requiring secondary barriers on newly manufactured passenger aircraft. This was a significant win for the Association. Airlines were given two years to comply, but some have since stretched this period well past the established deadline. In addition, this regulation doesn’t apply to existing aircraft, leaving many of the nation’s airline flight decks exposed.

Congress passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, creating what Capt. Jason Ambrosi, ALPA president, called, “A pathway to require secondary barriers for existing passenger aircraft to close a gap in safety regulations that was a priority after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”

The Association continues to serve as “the conscience of the airline industry,” ensuring that delays are spotlighted and addressed and that congressional directions are ultimately executed. For instance, the union recently learned that the FAA denied another attempt by the Regional Airline Association to avoid the extended deadline for secondary barrier installation on all newly manufactured airliners delivered after July 31, 2026.

Employee Identification Verification

In the months and years following 9/11, the DHS and the TSA instituted a variety of new screening protocols, consequently generating long lines and wait periods. ALPA, working in conjunction with airlines and regulators, considered new ways to remove flight crews from these lines and expedite the identification-verification process through risk-based screening programs.

One solution ALPA helped advance was the Canadian Restricted Area Identity Card (RAIC), a system that includes extensive background checks and identity confirmation using biometric technology. RAIC was fully implemented in Canada by late 2006.

In the United States, the Cockpit Access Security System (CASS), created in 2005, confirmed jumpseat eligibility across airlines. Additionally, the Crew Personnel Advanced Screening System (CrewPASS), introduced in 2008, was conceived by ALPA to verify pilot identities. CrewPASS was an expedited airport screening application that served as a prototype for the Known Crewmember (KCM) program, which was instituted in 2011.

A joint initiative between Airlines for America and ALPA, KCM requires a valid company ID, barcode/credentials, and a backup government-issued photo ID for instances of random verification. This year, the TSA begun implementing the Crewmember Access Point (CMAP) to replace KCM. CMAP aims to enhance security and will further streamline the screening process.

Pilot Engagement in Security Developments

These and other measures promoted by the Association during the post-9/11 period, and throughout the history of the airline industry, have helped ensure that aviation remains the safest and most secure form of public transportation. And ALPA will make certain that it has a seat at the table when any future security solutions are discussed.

There are boardroom solutions, motivated by the bottom line, and then there are practical decisions, and aviation safety and security demand the latter. The Association’s Air Safety Organization is the largest nongovernmental aviation safety organization in the world, and its members work at the epicenter of the aviation industry. They’re uniquely positioned to witness and identify its operational requisites and anticipate what’s needed on the horizon.